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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Aaron J. Campbell *
INTRODUCTION
This article aims to give a succinct review of notable criminal
law and procedure cases decided by the Supreme Court of Virgin-
ia and the Court of Appeals of Virginia during the past year. In-
stead of covering every ruling or rationale in these cases, the arti-
cle focuses on the "take-away" of the holdings with the most
precedential value. The article also summarizes noteworthy
changes to criminal law and procedure enacted by the 2017 Vir-
ginia General Assembly.
I. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Right to a Jury Trial
In Richardson v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia considered whether the defendant waived his right to a jury
trial even though he did not expressly ask to be tried by a judge.'
When the defendant "refused to participate in the colloquy during
his arraignment" on a felony, the trial court declared it would in-
terpret the defendant's "silence as both a waiver of his right to be
tried by a jury and an acquiescence to being tried by the court."2
The trial court then tried the case without a jury and found the
defendant guilty.3
On appeal, the defendant argued his conviction should be re-
versed because "he never knowingly and voluntarily waived his
* Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Appeals Section, Office of the Attorney Gen-
eral, Commonwealth of Virginia. J.D., 2009, University of Richmond School of Law; B.A.,
2002, Concord University.
1. 67 Va. App. 436, 439, 796 S.E.2d 854, 855 (2017).
2. Id. at 439, 796 S.E.2d at 855.
3. Id. at 440, 796 S.E.2d at 856.
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right to a jury trial."4 In finding in the defendant's favor, the
court of appeals explained that the Virginia Constitution guaran-
tees an accused a right to be tried by a jury, but not a right to be
tried by a judge.5 The court of appeals further explained that the
Virginia Constitution requires an accused to affirmatively con-
sent to be tried without a jury and that consent must be entered
in the record.6 In this case, the record did not demonstrate the de-
fendant affirmatively consented to a bench trial.7 The court of ap-
peals therefore held "that the trial court did not have jurisdiction
to proceed with [the defendant's] bench trial" and remanded the
case for a new trial.8
B. Withdrawal of a Guilty Plea
In Small v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia, for
the first time, recognized that trial courts should consider wheth-
er allowing a guilty plea to be withdrawn will cause prejudice to
the Commonwealth.9 After the defendant pled guilty to posses-
sion of a firearm by a convicted felon, the trial court continued
the sentencing hearing nine times so the defendant could testify
in another trial.10 After almost three years, the defendant moved
to withdraw his guilty plea, but was denied." In denying the mo-
tion, "the trial court found that the Commonwealth would be un-
duly prejudiced in trying [the defendant] due to the" amount of
time that had passed since the incident.12
The defendant maintained he should have been allowed to
withdraw his guilty plea because he had a reasonable defense
that he possessed the firearm out of necessity.13 The Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia found the defendant did not demonstrate he had
a reasonable defense to the charge.14 The supreme court agreed
that the defendant failed to show an 'imminent threatened harm'
4. Id. at 441, 796 S.E.2d at 856.
5. Id. at 442-43, 796 S.E.2d at 857 (citing VA. CONST. art. I, § 8).
6. Id. at 445, 796 S.E.2d at 858 (citing VA. CONST. art. I, § 8).
7. Id. at 447, 796 S.E.2d at 859.
8. Id. at 447, 796 S.E.2d at 859.
9. 292 Va. 292, 298, 788 S.E.2d 702, 705 (2016).
10. Id. at 294-95, 788 S.E.2d at 703.
11. Id. at 295, 788 S.E.2d at 703.
12. Id. at 295, 788 S.E.2d at 703.
13. Id. at 296, 788 S.E.2d at 704.
14. Id. at 299, 788 S.E.2d at 705.
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which led to him possessing a firearm" out of necessity.15 The su-
preme court also joined the Court of Appeals of Virginia and the
Fourth Circuit and recognized prejudice to the Commonwealth as
a relevant factor that should be considered when reviewing a mo-
tion to withdraw a guilty plea.16 Due to the lengthy delay between
the defendant's guilty plea and his motion to withdraw that plea,
the supreme court held that the trial court did not err "by weigh-
ing the equities and considering the resulting prejudice to the
Commonwealth."17
In Valazquez v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
decided whether filing a notice of appeal deprived the trial court
of jurisdiction to consider a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.18
After the defendant's guilty plea and sentencing, the trial court
appointed the defendant a new attorney for the appeal.19 On the
same day, the defendant's new attorney timely filed a notice of
appeal and a motion to withdraw the guilty plea.20 The trial court
ruled that the notice of appeal deprived the court of jurisdiction to
consider the motion to withdraw the plea, and alternatively, the
defendant did not prove a "manifest injustice" sufficient to with-
draw his plea.21 The supreme court agreed with the alternative
ruling that the defendant had not proven a "manifest injustice,"
and thus, the defendant's motion failed on the merits.22 As for the
jurisdictional ruling, however, the supreme court held that the fil-
ing of the notice of appeal did not divest the trial court of jurisdic-
tion.23 The supreme court concluded that, under the plain lan-
guage of Virginia Code section 19.2-296, a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea is timely so long as it is made within twenty-one days
of the final order imposing a sentence.24
15. Id. at 300, 788 S.E.2d at 706 (quoting Humphrey v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App.
36, 45, 553 S.E.2d 546, 550 (2001)).
16. Id. at 298, 788 S.E.2d at 705 (discussing United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d. 245,
248 (4th Cir. 1991); Howell v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 737, 749, 732 S.E.2d 722, 728
(2012); Hubbard v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 200, 211 n.4, 725 S.E.2d 163, 168 n.4
(2012)).
17. Id. at 298-99, 788 S.E.2d at 705.
18. 292 Va. 603, 610-11, 791 S.E.2d 556, 559 (2016).
19. Id. at 606, 791 S.E.2d at 557.
20. Id. at 606-07, 791 S.E.2d at 557.
21. Id. at 610, 791 S.E.2d at 559.
22. Id. at 616-17, 791 S.E.2d at 562.
23. Id. at 613, 791 S.E.2d at 560.
24. Id. at 613, 791 S.E.2d at 560.
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C. Defenses
In Hines v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia con-
sidered whether the defendant acted in self-defense when he shot
and killed someone in his home.25 The shooting victim, Hudson,
became belligerent while drinking at Hines's home.26 Hines testi-
fied that after Hudson brandished a gun in the presence of Hines
and his family, Hines retrieved his own gun from another room. 2 7
When Hines reentered the room, Hudson pointed his gun at
him.28 Hines then shot Hudson.29 At his trial for first degree mur-
der, Hines argued he acted in self-defense in shooting Hudson.30
"The trial court concluded as a matter of law, however, that Hines
did not carry his burden of proving his claim of self-defense be-
cause when he went to another room to retrieve his own gun, he
'removed himself from [the] danger."'31
The supreme court held that the trial court's conclusion was
contrary to the evidence and, therefore, "plainly wrong."32 Nota-
bly, the supreme court rejected the notion that Hines could not
claim self-defense because "he had the opportunity to remove
himself from the threat of danger."33 As a matter of legal principle
in Virginia, "when a party is assaulted in his own home, that par-
ty, as a homeowner (or tenant, as the case may be), has the right
to use whatever means necessary to repel the aggressor, 'even to
the taking of life."' 3 4 Given this principle and the facts of the case,
the supreme court concluded Hines shot Hudson in self-defense.35
In Broadous v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virgin-
ia interpreted, as a matter of first impression, the affirmative de-
fense afforded by Virginia Code section 18.2-251.03.36 In 2015, the
General Assembly passed that statute to provide a "safe harbor"
25. 292 Va. 674, 676-77, 791 S.E.2d 563, 563-64 (2016).
26. Id. at 677, 791 S.E.2d at 564.
27. Id. at 677, 791 S.E.2d at 564.
28. Id. at 677-78, 791 S.E.2d at 564.
29. Id. at 677-78, 791 S.E.2d at 564.
30. Id. at 677-78, 791 S.E.2d at 564.
31. Id. at 678, 791 S.E.2d at 564 (alteration in original).
32. Id. at 679, 791 S.E.2d at 565.
33. Id. at 681, 791 S.E.2d at 566.
34. Id. at 681, 791 S.E.2d at 566 (quoting Fortune v. Commonwealth, 133 Va. 669,
687, 112 S.E. 861, 867 (1922)).
35. Id. at 681, 791 S.E.2d at 566.
36. 67 Va. App. 265, 266, 268, 795 S.E.2d 904, 905 (2017).
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from prosecution for certain drug offenses for an accused who
"seeks or obtains" emergency medical treatment for a drug over-
dose.37 In this case, the defendant sought to apply the statute's
affirmative defense to her drug possession charge, even though
her boyfriend was the one who called 911 for her drug overdose.*l
The defendant argued the statute supplied an affirmative de-
fense to her charge because she was a person who 'obtained'
emergency medical attention for an overdose."39 In the defend-
ant's view, "the word 'obtains' should not be interpreted to require
a volitional act."4 0 In disagreeing with her interpretation of the
statute, the court of appeals held that, in context, "the words
'seek' and 'obtain' are active verbs that require more than passive
receipt of emergency medical attention."41 The court of appeals
concluded that a plain reading of the statute "provides an affirm-
ative defense only to the individual making the emergency re-
port," which, in this case, would have been the defendant's boy-
friend.42
D. Testimony
The Court of Appeals of Virginia's decision in Reyes v. Com-
monwealth involved the balance between the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to compel evidence in his favor and a witness's
Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination.43 Prior
to his trial for malicious wounding, the defendant filed a motion
to compel the testimony of one of his co-defendants.44 The co-
defendant opposed the motion and "invoked his Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination."45 The trial court had defense
counsel proffer the specific questions he intended to ask the co-
defendant outside the presence of the jury, so the court could de-
termine question by question whether the co-defendant "was enti-
tled to assert his Fifth Amendment right against self-
37. Id. at 268, 271, 795 S.E.2d at 905-07.
38. Id. at 266-67, 795 S.E.2d at 905.
39. Id. at 270-71, 795 S.E.2d at 906-07.
40. Id. at 270, 795 S.E.2d at 907.
41. Id. at 271, 795 S.E.2d at 907.
42. Id. at 273, 795 S.E.2d at 908.
43. 66 Va. App. 689, 693, 791 S.E.2d 357, 359 (2016).
44. Id. at 691, 791 S.E.2d at 358.
45. Id. at 691, 791 S.E.2d at 358.
2017] 33
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incrimination."46 After doing so, the trial court allowed the co-
defendant to assert his Fifth Amendment rights, finding that the
questions could expose him to federal prosecution.47
The defendant argued on appeal that his Sixth Amendment
right to call witnesses on his own behalf was violated when the
trial court prevented his co-defendant from testifying in the de-
fendant's favor.48 In rejecting this argument, the court of appeals
pointed out that "a defendant has 'no right to compel his co-
defendant to testify if the co-defendant elected to invoke his right
against self-incrimination."' 4 9 Ultimately, a trial court must de-
termine "question by question, whether a witness may invoke his
right against self-incrimination."50 The court of appeals concluded
that the trial court followed the proper procedure in this case and
"properly balanced [the defendant's] Sixth Amendment right to
compel evidence in his favor against the witness's Fifth Amend-
ment right to be free from self-incrimination."5 1
E. Jury Instructions
In Payne v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
considered whether the trial court erred in refusing a proffered
jury instruction on eyewitness identifications.5 2 A witness had
previously identified the defendant-in both a photo lineup and
at the preliminary hearing-as the man who had pointed a gun at
him.5 3 At the conclusion of the trial, the defendant proffered a ju-
ry instruction that contained four factors a jury should consider
in evaluating the reliability of eyewitness identifications.5 4 The
trial court refused the proffered instruction.55
46. Id. at 691-92, 791 S.E.2d at 358.
47. Id. at 692, 791 S.E.2d at 358.
48. Id. at 693, 791 S.E.2d at 359.
49. Id. at 693-94, 791 S.E.2d at 359 (quoting Dearing v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 117,
122, 524 S.E.2d 121, 124 (2000) (original alterations omitted)).
50. Id. at 694, 791 S.E.2d at 359 (citing Carter v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 735,
751, 576 S.E.2d 773, 781 (2003)).
51. Id. at 694-95, 791 S.E.2d at 360.
52. 292 Va. 855, 859, 863, 794 S.E.2d 577, 578-79, 581 (2016).
53. Id. at 860-61, 794 S.E.2d at 579-80.
54. Id. at 864, 794 S.E.2d at 582. The proffered jury instruction was 'loosely modeled"
on the instruction in United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 558-59 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Payne, 292 Va. at 859, 794 S.E.2d at 581.
55. Id. at 864, 794 S.E.2d at 582.
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In finding that the trial court did not err, the supreme court
held that "[t]he proffered instruction would have focused the ju-
ry's attention on four enumerated factors, thereby suggesting
that those four factors were exclusive or at least entitled to spe-
cial consideration or undue weight."5 6 As the supreme court ex-
plained, while a party may focus the jury's attention on evidence
during closing argument, "it is not appropriate for the court to do
so in a jury instruction because, under the law of Virginia, the ju-
ry is free to weigh the evidence how it chooses."57 The supreme
court made clear, however, that its decision should not be inter-
preted as a categorical prohibition against eyewitness identifica-
tion jury instructions in Virginia.58 So long as an instruction
"avoid[ed] the problem of focusing the jury's attention on a lim-
ited number of factors" and was supported by the evidence, a trial
court would not err in giving it.69
In Lindsey v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
addressed whether a jury instruction concerning the willful con-
cealment of goods violated the defendant's due process rights by
shifting the burden of proof.60 The defendant was caught conceal-
ing merchandise under his jacket at a store.61 At the defendant's
trial for petit larceny, the trial court gave the following jury in-
struction over the defendant's objection: "Willful concealment of
goods or merchandise while still on the premises of a store is evi-
dence of an intent to convert and defraud the owner of the value
of the goods or merchandise, unless there is believable evidence to
the contrary."62
The defendant argued that the instruction violated his due pro-
cess rights because it "contained a mandatory, rebuttable pre-
sumption that shifted the burden of proof to him."63 The supreme
court held, however, that the instruction contained only a "per-
missible inference that the jury was free to reject."64 The instruc-
tion "merely instructed the jury that willful concealment of goods
56. Id. at 871, 794 S.E.2d at 585.
57. Id. at 871, 794 S.E.2d at 585.
58. Id. at 872, 794 S.E.2d at 586.
59. Id. at 872, 794 S.E.2d at 586.
60. 293 Va. 1, 4-5, 795 S.E.2d 311, 312 (2017).
61. Id. at 4, 795 S.E.2d at 312.
62. Id. at 3-4, 795 S.E.2d at 312 (citing VA. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONs-CREIMINAL,
Jury Instr. No. 36.840 (Repl. ed. 2011)).
63. Id. at 5, 795 S.E.2d at 313.
64. Id. at 8, 795 S.E.2d at 314.
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while on the premises of a store is evidence of intent to convert
and defraud."65 The "instruction did not relieve the Common-
wealth of its burden of proving" the elements of the offense.66
Thus, the supreme court concluded that the trial court did not err
in giving the instruction.67
F. Sentencing
In Du v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia wres-
tled with whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering
the defendant to have no contact with one of the victims-his
stepmother.68 The defendant pled guilty to the "statutory rape of
his 13-year-old half-sister, aggravated malicious wounding of his
father, and malicious wounding of his stepmother."69 Prior to en-
tering his pleas, the defendant "wrote several letters to his father
and stepmother attempting to obstruct the ongoing investigation
of his charges and to keep them from testifying against him at
trial."70 As a condition of suspending a portion of the defendant's
sentence, the trial court ordered that the defendant have no con-
tact with the victims.7 1 After the trial court announced the condi-
tion, the prosecutor proffered simply that the defendant's step-
mother requested that the no-contact provision not apply to her.72
The trial court declined that request and a subsequent motion to
reconsider the no-contact provision.73
The supreme court held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in ordering the no-contact provision.74 The supreme
court found that the record-particularly the stepmother's victim
impact statement-contained "ample grounds for the trial court's
decision to discount the prosecutor's proffer of the stepmother's
65. Id. at 8, 795 S.E.2d at 314.
66. Id. at 8, 795 S.E.2d at 314.
67. Id. at 8, 795 S.E.2d at 314. Two justices dissented. Id. at 10, 795 S.E.2d at 315
(Goodwyn, J., dissenting). The dissenting justices would have found that the jury instruc-
tion was unconstitutional because it "contains mandatory language that a jury might rea-
sonably have understood as creating a mandatory rebuttable presumption that shifted the
burden of persuasion to the defendant." Id. at 17, 795 S.E.2d at 318-19.
68. 292 Va. 555, 557, 561, 790 S.E.2d 493, 495, 497 (2016).
69. Id. at 557, 790 S.E.2d at 495.
70. Id. at 558, 790 S.E.2d at 496.
71. Id. at 561, 790 S.E.2d at 497.
72. Id. at 561, 790 S.E.2d at 497.
73. Id. at 561-62, 790 S.E.2d 497-98.
74. Id. at 568, 790 S.E.2d at 501.
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wishes."75 The supreme court also shared the trial court's concern
that the defendant might later try again to pressure the step-
mother into recanting her testimony.76
G. Juvenile Life Sentences
A hotly contested issue continues to be the application of Miller
v. Alabama, in which the Supreme Court of the United States
held that a sentencing scheme mandating life without parole for
juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishments.77 The Supreme Court of Virginia's
most recent decision on the issue, Jones v. Commonwealth ("Jones
Il'), was actually the second time the court had considered
whether Jones's life sentence ran afoul of Miller.78 Three years
earlier, in Jones I, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the
sentencing scheme applicable to Jones's life sentence did not vio-
late Miller because "the trial court ha[d] the ability under Code §
19.2-303 to suspend part or all of the life sentence."79 The Su-
preme Court of the United States vacated and remanded Jones I
for reconsideration in light of its recent decision in Montgomery v.
Louisiana that Miller was retroactive.80
The Supreme Court of Virginia's opinion on remand was com-
plex, but essentially the court made three rulings. First, the su-
preme court reaffirmed its holding in Jones I that, under Virginia
law, "Jones's conviction was not a mandatory life without the pos-
sibility of parole scheme."81 Second, the supreme court rejected
Jones's argument that Montgomery and Miller require a hearing
to present mitigation evidence of his "youth and its attendant
characteristics."82 The supreme court rejected this argument, in
part, because Jones had the "constitutionally required opportuni-
75. Id. at 566-67, 790 S.E.2d at 500.
76. Id. at 567, 790 S.E.2d at 501. In dissent, Justice Powell acknowledged this was a
"horrible case," in which "one might wish to impose a no-contact condition." Id. at 568-69,
790 S.E.2d at 501 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell, however, would have held that
the no-contact provision, with regard to the stepmother, was an abuse of discretion. Id. at
568-69, 790 S.E.2d at 501-02.
77. 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012).
78. 293 Va. 29, 33-34, 37, 795 S.E.2d 705, 707, 709 (2017).
79. Jones v. Commonwealth (Jones 1), 288 Va. 475, 477, 763 S.E.2d 823, 823 (2014).
80. Jones II, 293 Va. at 33, 37, 795 S.E.2d at 707, 709 (citing Montgomery v. Louisi-
ana, 577 U.S. _, _, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732 (2016)).
81. Id. at 41, 795 S.E.2d at 712 (quoting Jones I, 288 Va. at 477, 763 S.E.2d at 823).
82. Id. at 42, 795 S.E.2d at 712.
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ty" to present such evidence, but "he simply chose not to exercise
it."83 Finally, the supreme court held that a Miller violation would
not make Jones's sentence "void ab initio," but would make it
"merely voidable."84 The supreme court concluded that a Miller
violation, like any voidable sentence, cannot be addressed by a
motion to vacate filed years later.85
H. Appeals
In Granado v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
reviewed whether the appellant's appeal should have been dis-
missed for failing to timely file a "written statement of facts in
lieu of a transcript."86 On the day of the deadline, the appellant
filed a proposed written statement of facts.87 Two days after the
initial filing, the appellant filed a revised version of the facts,
which the trial court signed two days later.88 The circuit court
clerk, however, only transmitted the revised version to the court
of appeals.89 In its per curiam order denying the appeal, the court
of appeals "held that because there was no timely filed transcript
or written statement of facts in the record, the record was insuffi-
cient to address the assignments of error."90 Three days after this
ruling, the circuit court clerk forwarded the original statement of
facts to the court of appeals.91 A three-judge panel of the court of
appeals nonetheless denied the appeal for the same reasons as
the per curium order.92
The supreme court held that the court of appeals erred in dis-
missing the appeal.93 The supreme court noted that a trial court
83. Id. at 43-44, 795 S.E.2d at 713.
84. See id. at 54, 795 S.E.2d at 720.
85. See id. at 54, 795 S.E.2d at 720. Three justices dissented. Id. at 60, 795 S.E.2d at
723 (Powell, J., dissenting). The dissenting justices would have held that "Montgomery
explicitly requires that a Miller hearing be held before a life sentence without parole may
be imposed upon a juvenile offender." Id. at 60, 795 S.E.2d at 723. Because Jones never
received such a hearing, the dissent would have held that the trial court was without ju-
risdiction to impose the life sentence. Id. at 60, 795 S.E.2d at 723.
86. 292 Va. 402, 405, 790 S.E.2d 233, 234 (2016).
87. Id. at 405, 790 S.E.2d at 234-35.
88. Id. at 405, 790 S.E.2d at 234-35.
89. Id. at 405, 790 S.E.2d at 235.
90. Id. at 405, 790 S.E.2d at 235.
91. Id. at 405-06, 790 S.E.2d at 235.
92. Id. at 406, 790 S.E.2d at 235.
93. Id. at 409, 790 S.E.2d at 237.
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has the "correction power . . . to enter a revised version of a time-
ly filed statement of facts."9 4 Here, the court of appeals should not
have dismissed the appeal because it had received an amended
record that contained the timely version of the statement of
facts.95 Also, because an appeal had not yet been granted, the
court of appeals did not need to issue "a writ of certiorari before it
could consider the contents of the amended record certified by the
clerk of the circuit court."9 6
II. CRIMINAL LAW
A. Search and Seizure
In Edmond v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
examined whether a police officer had reasonable suspicion to
stop the defendant's vehicle under the "collective knowledge doc-
trine."9 7 On May 5, 2014, Richmond police learned of a robbery
and homicide at a jewelry store.98 Earlier that day, Detective
Henry of the Henrico County Police Department received a report
of a "suspicious situation" at a bank, in which two individuals left
in a Dodge Durango.9 9 Detective Henry located the lease owner of
the Durango and learned that it had a GPS tracking device.10 0
Using the GPS tracking technology, the officer discovered that
the Durango had been near the jewelry store shortly before the
robbery.10 1 Detective Henry passed on this information to Detec-
tive Gouldman of the City of Richmond Police Department.102 The
next day, the GPS tracking showed the Durango in North Caroli-
na.103 Detective Henry provided this information to Detective
Gouldman, who contacted the United States Marshal's office for
assistance in locating the vehicle.104 A Deputy United States
Marshal in North Carolina located the Durango and, after speak-
94. Id. at 409, 790 S.E.2d at 237 (citing VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:8(d) (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
95. See id. at 408, 790 S.E.2d at 236.
96. Id. at 409, 790 S.E.2d at 236-37.
97. 66 Va. App. 490, 493, 498, 788 S.E.2d 277, 279, 281 (2016).
98. Id. at 493-94, 788 S.E.2d at 279.
99. Id. at 494, 788 S.E.2d at 279.
100. Id. at 494-95, 788 S.E.2d at 279.
101. Id. at 495, 788 S.E.2d at 279.
102. Id. at 493-95, 788 S.E.2d at 279.
103. Id. at 495, 788 S.E.2d at 279.
104. Id. at 495, 788 S.E.2d at 279-80.
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ing with Detective Gouldman about the matter, had local law en-
forcement stop the vehicle.105
On appeal, the defendant argued that the Deputy United
States Marshal did not have "a reasonable, articulable suspicion"
to stop the vehicle.106 In deciding this issue, the court of appeals,
for the first time in Virginia, adopted the "collective knowledge
doctrine."107 Under the doctrine, "an officer is justified in acting
upon an instruction from another officer if the instructing officer
had sufficient information to justify taking such action him-
self."108 In applying the collective knowledge doctrine to this case,
the court of appeals found that the Deputy United States Marshal
was "little more than a conduit or 'go between' transmitting in-
formation" to the local police.109 The court of appeals concluded
that the instructing officer was actually Detective Gouldman and
that he possessed the necessary reasonable suspicion to effectuate
the stop.110 Accordingly, the stop did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.111
In Collins v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
considered whether the trial court erred in denying a "motion to
suppress evidence obtained when police conducted a warrantless
search of a stolen motorcycle parked in the driveway" of the de-
fendant's home.112 The motorcycle in question had twice eluded
law enforcement.113 During the second encounter, Officer Rhodes
took a picture of the motorcycle's license plate and later learned
that the motorcycle had been stolen.114 A few months later, while
investigating another matter involving the defendant, officers
confronted the defendant about the motorcycle.115 The defendant
denied any knowledge of the motorcycle, despite pictures on his
Facebook account of him with the motorcycle.116 Shortly thereaf-
105. Id. at 495-97, 788 S.E.2d at 280.
106. Id. at 499, 788 S.E.2d at 282.
107. Id. at 503, 788 S.E.2d at 283.
108. Id. at 503, 788 S.E.2d at 283.
109. Id. at 505, 788 S.E.2d at 284.
110. Id. at 504, 788 S.E.2d at 284.
111. Id. at 506, 788 S.E.2d at 285.
112. 292 Va. 486, 488, 790 S.E.2d 611, 612 (2016), cert. granted, No. 16-1027, 2017 U.S.
LEXIS 4455 (Sept. 28, 2017).
113. Id. at 489, 790 S.E.2d at 612-13.
114. Id. at 489-90, 790 S.E.2d at 613.
115. Id. at 491, 790 S.E.2d at 613.
116. Id. at 491, 790 S.E.2d at 613.
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ter, Officer Rhodes located the house in the pictures and what
appeared to be a motorcycle covered with a tarp in the drive-
way.117 The officer lifted the tarp, located the vehicle identifica-
tion number, and confirmed that it was the same stolen motorcy-
cle that had eluded him.118
The trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the
evidence obtained from Officer Rhodes's search.119 The Court of
Appeals of Virginia upheld the trial court's ruling "under the exi-
gent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment's war-
rant requirement."120 The supreme court held that the case was
"more properly addressed by a different exception to the warrant
requirement: the automobile exception."121 There exists a "simple,
bright-line test for the automobile exception: '[i]f a car is readily
mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contra-
band, the Fourth Amendment ... permits police to search the ve-
hicle without more."' 1 2 2 In applying the exception to this case, the
supreme court found that Officer Rhodes had probable cause to
believe the motorcycle was contraband.123 The supreme court fur-
ther found that the automobile exception applies even if the vehi-
cle is not "immediately mobile."1 2 4 Finally, the supreme court held




1. Accessory After the Fact to Murder
In Suter v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
addressed an issue of first impression in Virginia: whether acces-
sory after the fact to murder requires the victim's death to have
117. Id. at 491, 790 S.E.2d at 614.
118. Id. at 492, 790 S.E.2d at 614.
119. Id. at 495, 790 S.E.2d at 615.
120. Id. at 495, 790 S.E.2d at 615 (citing Collins v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 37, 46-
48, 773 S.E.2d 618, 623-24 (2015)).
121. Id. at 497, 790 S.E.2d at 617.
122. Id. at 498, 790 S.E.2d at 617 (alterations in original) (quoting Maryland v. Dyson,
527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999)).
123. Id. at 498-99, 790 S.E.2d at 617.
124. See id. at 499-501, 790 S.E.2d at 617-18.
125. See id. at 501-03, 790 S.E.2d at 619-20. In dissent, Justice Mims would not have
applied the automobile exception because, in his view, "Officer Rhodes did not search an
automobile, he searched a tarp." Id. at 506, 790 S.E.2d at 621 (Mims, J., dissenting).
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occurred prior to the rendering of aid.126 Following a shooting, the
defendant drove the shooter away from the scene of the crime.127
Two days later, the victim died from the gunshot wounds.128 The
defendant challenged her conviction to accessory after the fact to
murder, arguing that because the victim did not die until two
days after he had been shot, she could not have possessed the
requisite knowledge that a homicide had occurred when she ren-
dered aid to the shooter.129 The court of appeals agreed.130
Under the common law, a felony must be complete at the time
the assistance is rendered to constitute accessory after the fact.131
The court of appeals concluded that because this common law
rule "has not been modified by the General Assembly, a person
cannot, as a matter of law, be convicted as an accessory after the
fact to a murder because of aid given after the murderer's acts
but before the victim's death."132 The court of appeals noted that
"a small minority of jurisdictions have departed from the re-
quirement that the death must have occurred prior to the render-
ing of assistance."1 33 The court of appeals declined, however, to
depart from the common law rule, noting that any change to the
common law is a decision that rests with the General Assem-
bly. 134
2. Assault and Battery
In Commonwealth v. Lambert, the Supreme Court of Virginia
examined whether the "Court of Appeals erred in reversing a
school teacher's misdemeanor conviction for assault and battery
of a special needs student."135 The teacher was on "bus duty"
when a "bus arrived carrying . .. an eleven-year-old student with
Downs Syndrome."136 The student got off the bus, handed her be-
126. 67 Va. App. 311, 318, 796 S.E.2d 416, 420 (2017).
127. Id. at 315, 796 S.E.2d at 418.
128. Id. at 315, 796 S.E.2d at 418.
129. Id. at 318, 796 S.E.2d at 420.
130. Id. at 320, 796 S.E.2d at 421.
131. Id. at 319, 796 S.E.2d at 420.
132. Id. at 320, 796 S.E.2d at 421.
133. Id. at 321, 796 S.E.2d at 421 (discussing Maddox v. Commonwealth, 349 S.W.2d
686 (Ky. 1960) as an example of a jurisdiction that departed from the requirement).
134. Id. at 323, 796 S.E.2d at 422.
135. 292 Va. 748, 750, 793 S.E.2d 805, 806 (2016).
136. Id. at 751, 793 S.E.2d at 806.
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longings to a teacher's aide, and went into the school building.137
The teacher confronted the student inside and yelled at her to go
back out and get her things.138 When the student refused, the
teacher grabbed the child by the arm and dragged her outside.139
At her trial for misdemeanor assault and battery, the teacher
moved to strike the evidence, arguing that her physical contact
with the student fell within the Virginia Code section 18.2-
57(G)(i) exception.40 For that exception to apply, "a full-time
school employee must be acting in the course and scope of her of-
ficial capacity and the conduct at issue must be 'incidental, minor
or reasonable physical contact or other actions designed to main-
tain order and control."141 The trial court found the exception in-
applicable because the teacher had acted outside the scope of her
official capacity.142 In the alternative, the trial court ruled that
the teacher's conduct was "still 'unreasonable' and exceeded the
physical contact permitted by school personnel" under the stat-
ute.143 The court of appeals found error in the trial court's ruling
that the teacher had acted outside the scope of her official capaci-
ty.14 4 The supreme court held that the court of appeals did not
give due consideration to the trial court's alternative ruling that,
even under the teacher's version of the facts, her actions exceeded
the physical contact permitted by school personnel under Virginia
Code section 18.2-57(G)(i).145 The supreme court held the factual
finding by the trial court was "fully supported by the record ...
and it rendered the Code § 18.2-57(G)(i) exception inapplica-
ble."14 6
3. Attempted Murder
In Jin v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia de-
cided whether the defendant's two counts of attempted murder
137. Id. at 751, 793 S.E.2d at 806.
138. Id. at 752, 793 S.E.2d at 806-07.
139. Id. at 751-52, 793 S.E.2d at 806-07.
140. Id. at 753, 755, 793 S.E.2d at 807-08.
141. Id. at 753, 793 S.E.2d at 807 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57(G) (Cum. Supp.
2017)).
142. Id. at 755, 793 S.E.2d at 808.
143. Id. at 759, 793 S.E.2d at 810.
144. Id. at 756, 793 S.E.2d at 808-09 (quoting Lambert v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App.
682, 690-91, 779 S.E.2d 871, 874-75 (2015)).
145. Id. at 759, 793 S.E.2d at 810.
146. Id. at 760, 793 S.E.2d at 810.
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violated double jeopardy because they were part of one continuing
offense or whether they were separate and distinct acts.147 After
an argument with his estranged wife, the defendant entered his
car and accelerated toward her as she walked away.148 The wife's
brother pulled her out of the way, but the side mirror of the de-
fendant's car struck her in the face.149 Shortly thereafter, the de-
fendant succeeded in hitting his wife and her brother with the
car.150 The defendant then removed a hammer from the back of
the car and entered the backdoor of the restaurant where his wife
was lying injured.15 1 The defendant proceeded to "hit [his wife]
multiple times in the head with the hammer."15 2
The defendant argued that his two convictions for attempted
murder violated double jeopardy because the attempts-the one
with a car and the one with a hammer-were part of one continu-
ing offense.153 The court of appeals, however, held that the two at-
tempts were separate and distinct acts.15 4 The court of appeals
concluded that each act "independently met the requirements of
an attempted murder."55 The court of appeals further concluded
that the "more vicious, hands-on" act of violence with the hammer
was not a continuation of the first attack with the car.156 In doing
so, the court of appeals noted that the "two acts occurred in dif-
ferent locations and were perpetrated by different means, with a
short break of time between the two."157 Thus, the defendant's
double jeopardy rights were not violated.158
4. Carjacking
In Hilton v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
considered whether seizing a vehicle's keys by gunpoint support-
ed a conviction for carjacking.159 The two victims were a father
147. 67 Va. App. 294, 299, 795 S.E.2d 918, 921 (2017).
148. Id. at 300-01, 795 S.E.2d at 921.
149. Id. at 301, 795 S.E.2d at 921.
150. Id. at 301, 795 S.E.2d at 922.
151. Id. at 301, 795 S.E.2d at 922.
152. Id. at 301, 795 S.E.2d at 922.
153. Id. at 302, 795 S.E.2d at 922.
154. Id. at 305-06, 795 S.E.2d at 924.
155. Id. at 306, 795 S.E.2d at 924.
156. Id. at 307, 795 S.E.2d at 925.
157. Id. at 307, 795 S.E.2d at 925.
158. Id. at 307, 795 S.E.2d at 925.
159. 293 Va. 293, 296-97, 797 S.E.2d 781, 782-83 (2017).
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and son who had answered an advertisement for a used car.160
When the victims went to view the car, they encountered the de-
fendant and his companion.161 "The advertised car was nowhere
to be seen."162 The defendant and his companion proceeded to rob
the victims at gunpoint.163 During the robbery, the robbers point-
ed a gun at the father's chest and threatened to shoot him before
taking his truck keys and ordering both victims back into the
truck.164 After the victims entered the truck, the robbers proceed-
ed to walk away.165
In affirming the defendant's conviction for carjacking, the su-
preme court observed that under Virginia's carjacking statute,
Virginia Code section 18.2-58.1, "a perpetrator can commit car-
jacking without actually seizing the victim's vehicle, i.e., taking
possession of it."166 Under the statute's express language, "a per-
petrator can violate the statute by only seizing control of the vic-
tim's vehicle . . . ."167 In this case, the victim had "'possession or
control' of his truck while standing beside it with his truck keys
in his pocket."168 That changed, however, when the defendant
took the victim's truck keys "by means of pulling out a revolver,
pointing it at the victim's chest at point-blank range, and
threatening to shoot the victim as he and his son were being
robbed . . . ."169 That was enough to seize control of the truck be-
cause "[a]t that point, the victim was not free to get back into his
truck, much less drive it."170
5. Credit Card Theft
In Scott v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia de-
fined the type of criminal intent needed to support a credit card
160. Id. at 296, 797 S.E.2d at 783.
161. Id. at 296, 797 S.E.2d at 783.
162. Id. at 296, 797 S.E.2d at 783.
163. Id. at 297, 797 S.E.2d at 783.
164. Id. at 297, 797 S.E.2d at 783.
165. Id. at 297, 797 S.E.2d at 783.
166. Id. at 298-99, 797 S.E.2d at 783-84 (discussing VA. CODE. ANN. § 18.2-58.1 (Repl.
Vol. 2014)).
167. Id. at 299, 797 S.E.2d at 784 (discussing VA. CODE. ANN. § 18.2-58.1 (Repl. Vol.
2014)).
168. Id. at 300, 797 S.E.2d at 785.
169. Id. at 300-01, 797 S.E.2d at 785.
170. Id. at 301, 797 S.E.2d at 785.
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theft conviction under Virginia Code section 18.2-192.171 The de-
fendant broke into his ex-partner's home and took her purse, con-
taining her credit cards.172 The next day, the defendant "called
the victim and told her that the purse was at her mother's
house."1 7 3 When the victim retrieved her purse, her credit cards
were still there, and it did not appear that the defendant had
tried to use them. 174
The defendant argued that the credit card theft statute re-
quired the Commonwealth to prove specific intent as an element
of the crime and that the facts did not show he had the specific
intent to take the credit cards.175 The Commonwealth argued that
specific intent only applied to the second prong of the statute-
"receiving a stolen credit card, knowing it to have been stolen,
with the intent to use it, sell it, or transfer it to another unau-
thorized person . . . ."176 The Commonwealth interpreted the stat-
ute's first prong-unlawfully "taking, obtaining or withholding a
credit card" or credit card number-as requiring only a general
criminal intent.177 The supreme court agreed with the Common-
wealth's interpretation and held that "credit card theft under the
first prong of the statute is a general intent crime completed upon
an unlawful taking."178
6. Driving Under the Influence ("DUI") Related Offenses
In Rich v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia in-
terpreted the causation element of DUI maiming. 179 On August 6,
2011, at approximately 2:20 AM, a witness stopped her vehicle
when she saw the victim crossing her lane of traffic in a wheel-
chair.180 The witness told the victim, who was intoxicated and op-
erating the wheelchair in an "erratic fashion," to be careful.181
When the victim reached the opposite lane of traffic, the defend-
171. 292 Va. 380, 385, 789 S.E.2d 608, 610 (2016).
172. Id. at 381-82, 789 S.E.2d at 608-09.
173. Id. at 382, 789 S.E.2d at 609.
174. Id. at 382, 789 S.E.2d at 609.
175. Id. at 383, 789 S.E.2d at 609.
176. Id. at 383-85, 789 S.E.2d at 609-10.
177. Id. at 383-85, 789 S.E.2d at 609-10.
178. Id. at 385, 789 S.E.2d at 610.
179. 292 Va. 791, 794, 793 S.E.2d 798, 800 (2016).
180. Id. at 794-95, 793 S.E.2d at 800.
181. Id. at 795, 797, 793 S.E.2d at 800-01.
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ant's vehicle crashed into the wheelchair at about twenty-five or
thirty miles per hour.182 The defendant-who was intoxicated, in-
attentive, and sleep deprived-was convicted of DUI maiming in
violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-51.4.183
On appeal, the defendant argued "that the trial court erred in
finding that she was a proximate cause of [the victim's] injuries
because it is impossible to determine how and why the collision
occurred."184 The supreme court disagreed, finding that there
were "ample facts from which the trial court could draw reasona-
ble inferences" as to the cause of the accident.185 Notable were the
defendant's voluntary intoxication, admitted inattentiveness, and
sleep deprivation.186 Also notable was that the other driver, "un-
der similar conditions . . . was able to see [the victim] in time to
allow him to cross the street."187
In Kim v. Commonwealth, the defendant challenged his convic-
tion for unreasonably refusing to submit to a breath test in viola-
tion of Virginia Code section 18.2-268.3.188 Because a refusal
charge requires operation of a vehicle on a highway, as defined in
Virginia Code section 46.2-100, the dispositive issue for the Su-
preme Court of Virginia was whether the defendant was on a
highway or a private road.189 In the early morning hours, police
found a "vehicle parked 'somewhat diagonally' in one of the park-
ing spaces" at a private apartment complex.190 The defendant was
asleep and drunk in the driver's seat of the vehicle.191 The park-
ing spaces ran perpendicular to the privately maintained roads
within the complex.192 The apartment complex was accessible by
public roads, but throughout the complex were several "No Tres-
passing" signs.193
The supreme court began its analysis by reviewing the case law
on "whether a particular 'way' falls within the statutory defini-
182. Id. at 795, 793 S.E.2d at 800.
183. Id. at 798, 793 S.E.2d at 802.
184. Id. at 799, 793 S.E.2d at 802.
185. Id. at 800M1, 793 S.E.2d at 803.
186. Id. at 801, 793 S.E.2d at 804.
187. Id. at 801, 793 S.E.2d at 804.
188. 293 Va. 304, 307, 797 S.E.2d 766, 767 (2017).
189. Id. at 310-11, 797 S.E.2d at 769.
190. Id. at 307-08, 797 S.E.2d at 767-68.
191. Id. at 308, 797 S.E.2d at 768.
192. Id. at 307-08, 797 S.E.2d at 767.
193. Id. at 307-08, 797 S.E.2d at 767.
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tion of 'highway."' 194 The case law has established that a particu-
lar way is a highway when the public has unrestricted access to
it.195 Moreover, "[a] sufficient showing of unrestricted access gives
rise to the [rebuttable] presumption that the way is a high-
way."196 In order to rebut the presumption, the opposing party
must show the area was not open to the public. 197 In this case, the
supreme court found that the Commonwealth had met its initial
burden of showing that the presumption applied.198 The supreme
court, however, found that the defendant had successfully rebut-
ted that presumption.199 Key to the supreme court's holding was
the presence of the several posted "No Trespassing" signs, which
established that the apartment complex's roads were "not 'open to
the use of the public' for any purpose, including vehicular trav-
el." 2
00
7. Failure to Appear
In Johnson v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
addressed whether the defendant who failed to show for court on
multiple pending charges could be convicted of multiple failure to
appear charges.201 The defendant was charged with "forgery, ut-
tering, and attempting to obtain money by false pretenses."202 "All
three charges stemmed from allegations that [the defendant] had
altered a check written by a third party and attempted to cash
it."203 The defendant failed to appear for a preliminary hearing on
the charges in general district court.204 The grand jury therefore
indicted the defendant "for three counts of felony failure to ap-
pear" in violation of Virginia Code section 19.2-128(B).205
194. Id. at 312-15, 797 S.E.2d at 770-72.
195. Id. at 315, 797 S.E.2d at 772 (citing Caplan v. Bogard, 264 Va. 219, 227, 563
S.E.2d 719, 723 (2002)).
196. Id. at 315, 797 S.E.2d at 772 (quoting Caplan, 264 Va. at 227, 563 S.E.2d at 723).
197. Id. at 315, 797 S.E.2d at 772 (citing Caplan, 264 Va. at 227, 563 S.E.2d at 723).
198. Id. at 316, 797 S.E.2d at 772.
199. Id. at 319, 797 S.E.2d at 773-74.
200. Id. at 319-20, 797 S.E.2d at 774. Three justices dissented. Id. at 320, 797 S.E.2d
at 774 (Kelsey, J., dissenting). The dissenting justices would have held that, based on the
record, a reasonable factfinder could have determined that the apartment complex road
was a "highway" under Code § 46.2-100. See id. at 320, 797 S.E.2d at 774.
201. 292 Va. 738, 740, 793 S.E.2d 321, 322 (2016).
202. Id. at 740, 793 S.E.2d at 322.
203. Id. at 740, 793 S.E.2d at 322.
204. Id. at 740, 793 S.E.2d at 322.
205. Id. at 740, 793 S.E.2d at 322.
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The defendant argued that, under the statute, "he could be
convicted of, at most, one felony failure to appear."206 The defend-
ant reasoned that the "gravamen" of the offense was the failing to
appear for court, not the number of charges pending when he
failed to appear.207 In rejecting this argument, the supreme court
looked at the statutory language and noted that "[t]he legislature
selected the term 'a' felony, thereby indicating that each felony
charge could serve as the predicate of a failure to appear convic-
tion." 2 08 The supreme court went on to explain that "[a] defend-
ant's willful failure to appear prevents the Commonwealth from
proceeding on each of the separate felonies and it prevents the
court from adjudicating each charge."209 The "net effect of [the de-
fendant's] willful failure to appear were three distinct injuries to
the administration of justice, even if these injuries occurred at
the same time."2 10
8. Threats
In Turner v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
considered whether the defendant's conviction for displaying a
noose with the intent to intimidate offended the First Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution.2 1 1 Turner had displayed
in his yard an "all-black, life-size dummy hanging by a noose from
a tree."2 12 The noose display was visible to any passerby, includ-
ing his African-American neighbors, who reported it to the po-
lice.2 13 When confronted by police about the noose display, Turner
said it was a "scarecrow" and "implied it was to scare away peo-
ple."2 1 4 Turner then indicated his actions were motivated by his
racist beliefs.215 Turner's neighbors felt threatened by the noose
display, especially since "nine African-Americans had been killed
206. Id. at 740, 793 S.E.2d at 322.
207. Id. at 740, 793 S.E.2d at 322.
208. Id. at 742, 793 S.E.2d at 323.
209. Id. at 742, 793 S.E.2d at 323.
210. Id. at 742, 793 S.E.2d at 323. Two justices dissented. Id. at 744, 793 S.E.2d at 324
(Mims, J., dissenting). In their view, the defendant committed a single violation when he
failed to "appear at one time and one place." Id. at 744, 793 S.E.2d 324.
211. 67 Va. App. 46, 51, 57, 792 S.E.2d 299, 301, 304 (2016), cert. granted, No. 161804,
2017 Va. LEXIS 130 (Sept. 8, 2017).
212. Id. at 51, 792 S.E.2d at 301.
213. Id. at 51-52, 792 S.E.2d at 301-02.
214. Id. at 52, 792 S.E.2d at 302.
215. Id. at 52, 792 S.E.2d at 302.
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in South Carolina earlier the same day at the 'Charleston Church
Shooting."'216 Turner was found guilty of violating Virginia Code
section 18.2-423.2, which prohibits displaying a noose with the in-
tent to intimidate.217
The defendant argued the First Amendment gave him the right
to hang a noose on his property.218 In finding no First Amend-
ment violation, the court of appeals noted that Virginia's noose
statute is "substantially similar" to the cross-burning statute that
the Supreme Court of the United States upheld in Virginia v.
Black.219 Like the cross burning statute, "displaying a noose in
the manner [Virginia] Code § 18.2-423.2 proscribes constitutes a
'true threat' . . . [that] is undeserving of First Amendment protec-
tion." 2 2 0 As the court of appeals concluded, "while the First
Amendment protects Turner's right to be a racist and even to
convey his racist beliefs to others, the protections of our Constitu-
tion do not permit him to threaten or intimidate others who do
not share his views."221
III. LEGISLATION
A. Blood Test Refusal
In Birchfield v. North Dakota, the Supreme Court of the United
States held that imposing a criminal penalty for refusing to con-
sent to a blood test is unconstitutional because, unlike the less in-
trusive breath test, the search incident to arrest doctrine does not
justify the warrantless taking of a blood sample.222 In response to
Birchfield, the 2017 General Assembly eliminated the criminal
penalties for refusing to submit to a blood test to determine the
alcohol or drug content of a defendant's blood upon an arrest for a
DUI related offense.223 The legislation, however, increased the
criminal penalty for a second offense of refusing to submit to a
216. Id. at 53, 792 S.E.2d at 302.
217. Id. at 54-55, 792 S.E.2d at 303.
218. Id. at 56-57, 792 S.E.2d at 304.
219. Id. at 57-58, 792 S.E.2d at 304 (citing Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 347-48
(2003)).
220. Id. at 61, 792 S.E.2d at 306.
221. Id. at 61, 792 S.E.2d at 306.
222. 579 U.S. -_, _, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2166-67, 2184-86 (2016).
223. See Act of Mar. 16, 2017, ch. 623, 2017 Va. Acts _, _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-268.3 (Cum. Supp. 2017)).
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breath test from a Class 2 misdemeanor to a Class 1 misdemean-
or.2 2 4 The legislation also created a rebuttable presumption of in-
toxication for blood tests performed by the Department of Foren-
sic Science pursuant to a search warrant.225 Lastly, the legislation
provided that an application for a search warrant to perform a
blood test on a person suspected of committing a DUI-related of-
fense shall be given priority over other matters pending before
the judge or magistrate.226
B. Delayed Appeals
The 2017 General Assembly expanded an appellant's ability to
obtain a delayed appeal in a criminal case.2 2 7 Previously, an ap-
pellant could not pursue a delayed appeal if any part of the ap-
peal had been refused on the merits.228 Now, an appellant may
seek a delayed appeal for a procedurally defaulted assignment of
error, even if other assignments of error were refused on the mer-
its.229
C. Domestic Abuse
The 2017 General Assembly passed two bills pertaining to first
offenders of domestic violence. The first prevents a person previ-
ously convicted of a violent felony under Virginia Code section
19.2-297.1 from being eligible for a first offender status for as-
sault and battery against a family or household member.230 The
person may, however, be placed on first offender status if the at-
torney for the Commonwealth does not object to the deferral.231
The second prohibits a person who consented to a first offender
disposition on a domestic violence charge from appealing if he is
subsequently found guilty for violating the terms of the proba-
224. Id.
225. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-269 (Cum. Supp. 2017)).
226. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-52 (Cum. Supp. 2017)).
227. Act of Feb. 20, 2017, ch. 77, 2017 Va. Acts _, _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 19.2-321.1 to -321.2 (Cum. Supp. 2017)).
228. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-321.1(A)(ii), 19.1-321.2(A)(ii) (Repl. Vol. 2015).
229. Ch. 77, 2017 Va. Acts _, _.
230. Act of Mar. 16, 2017, ch. 621, 2017 Va. Acts -, (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-57.3 (Cum. Supp. 2017)).
231. Id.
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tion.232 The person "may file a motion to withdraw his consent ...
within 10 days of the entry of the order deferring proceedings"
and the "court shall schedule a hearing within 30 days of receipt
of the motion."233 "If the person appears at the hearing and re-
quests to withdraw his consent, the court shall grant such re-
quest, enter a final order adjudicating guilt, and sentence the
person accordingly."234 If the person fails to show for the hearing,
the court shall deny the motion.235
D. Female Genital Mutilation
The 2017 General Assembly created a Class 1 misdemeanor for
any person to knowingly circumcise, excise, or infibulate the labia
majora, labia minora, or clitoris of a minor.236 It is also a Class 1
misdemeanor for any parent, guardian, or other person responsi-
ble for the care of a minor to consent to such circumcision, exci-
sion, or infibulation.237 Finally, it is a Class 1 misdemeanor for
any parent, guardian, or other person responsible for the care of a
minor to knowingly remove, cause, or permit the removal of such
minor from the Commonwealth for the purposes of performing
such circumcision, excision, or infibulation.238
E. Marijuana Possession
The 2017 General Assembly created an exception to the man-
datory six month driver's license suspension for persons placed on
a deferred disposition for a drug offense.239 A court now retains
the discretion as to whether to suspend or revoke the driver's li-
cense of a person placed on deferred disposition for simple posses-
sion of marijuana.240 The exception applies only to adults, not ju-
232. Act of Apr. 5, 2017, ch. 785, 2017 Va. Acts , _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE




236. Act of Mar. 20, 2017, ch. 667, 2017 Va. Acts _, (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-51.7 (Cum. Supp. 2017)).
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239. Act of Mar. 24, 2017, ch. 695, 2017 Va. Acts.-_, (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 46.2-390.1 (Cum. Supp. 2017)).
240. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-251 (Cum. Supp. 2017)).
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veniles.241 Also, the exception does not apply if the person was op-
erating a motor vehicle at the time of the offense.242 Finally, a
person whose driver's license is not suspended or revoked must
perform fifty hours of community service in addition to any com-
munity service ordered as part of the deferred disposition.243
F. Peeping or Spying with an Electronic Device
The 2017 General Assembly created a Class 1 misdemeanor
prohibiting the knowing and intentional use of an electronic de-
vice to enter the property of another to secretly or furtively peep,
spy, or attempt to peep or spy into a dwelling or occupied building
located on the property.244 These provisions do not apply to lawful
criminal investigations.245
G. Withdrawal of Defense Counsel
Under new legislation, "[a] privately retained counsel in any
criminal case may, pursuant to the terms of a written agreement
between the attorney and the client, withdraw from representa-
tion . . . without leave of court after certification of a charge by a
district court."246 Within ten days of the certification, the attorney
must also provide written notice to the client, the attorney for the
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